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Abstract
Background: Decision curve analysis (DCA) has been proposed as an alternative method for evaluation of
diagnostic tests, prediction models, and molecular markers. However, DCA is based on expected utility theory,
which has been routinely violated by decision makers. Decision-making is governed by intuition (system 1), and
analytical, deliberative process (system 2), thus, rational decision-making should reflect both formal principles of
rationality and intuition about good decisions. We use the cognitive emotion of regret to serve as a link between
systems 1 and 2 and to reformulate DCA.
Methods: First, we analysed a classic decision tree describing three decision alternatives: treat, do not treat, and
treat or no treat based on a predictive model. We then computed the expected regret for each of these
alternatives as the difference between the utility of the action taken and the utility of the action that, in retrospect,
should have been taken. For any pair of strategies, we measure the difference in net expected regret. Finally, we
employ the concept of acceptable regret to identify the circumstances under which a potentially wrong strategy is
tolerable to a decision-maker.
Results: We developed a novel dual visual analog scale to describe the relationship between regret associated
with “omissions” (e.g. failure to treat) vs. “commissions” (e.g. treating unnecessary) and decision maker’s preferences
as expressed in terms of threshold probability. We then proved that the Net Expected Regret Difference, first
presented in this paper, is equivalent to net benefits as described in the original DCA. Based on the concept of
acceptable regret we identified the circumstances under which a decision maker tolerates a potentially wrong
decision and expressed it in terms of probability of disease.
Conclusions: We present a novel method for eliciting decision maker’s preferences and an alternative derivation of
DCA based on regret theory. Our approach may be intuitively more appealing to a decision-maker, particularly in
those clinical situations when the best management option is the one associated with the least amount of regret
(e.g. diagnosis and treatment of advanced cancer, etc).
Background
Decision making is often governed by uncertainty that
inevitably affects the overall decision process. In their
efforts to model uncertainty, decision theorists have pro-
posed many methodologies with the majority of them
having been based on statistics and probability [1-4],
information theory and entropy [5], or possibilistic
approaches such as fuzzy logic [6,7].
In clinical medical research, much effort has been
invested in developing decision support systems for
diagnosis and treatment of various clinical conditions
such as management of infectious diseases in an inten-
sive care unit, chronic prostatitis, or liver surgery [8-12]
to name a few examples. Most of these systems are
based on probabilistic prediction models. Even though
prediction models have been shown to be generally
superior and potentially complementary to physicians’
prognostications [13-15], historically they have not ful-
filled decision makers expectations to help improve
decision-making. One reason for this is that most
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on expected utility theory that humans often violate
[14,16,17]. In addition, most models in medicine do not
incorporate decision-makers’ preferences, which in addi-
tion to having reliable evidence, is the key to rational
decision-making [18-20].
The goal of this paper is to develop a novel decision-
making approach that incorporates the decision maker’s
attitudes towards multiple treatment strategies. Our goal
is addressed through the following three specific aims.
First, we deviate from the traditional expected utility
theory in an attempt to satisfy both formal criteria of
rationality and human intuition about good decisions
[18-22]. We employ regret theory, since regret is a cog-
nitive emotion that combines both rationality and intui-
tion, which are key elements for decision-making
[22,23], to develop a novel methodology for eliciting
decision makers’ personal preferences. Consequently we
reformulate decision curve analysis (DCA) [24,25] from
the regret theory point of view to evaluate alternative
treatment strategies and to integrate both evidence on
prognosis and treatment with the decision maker’sa t t i -
tudes and preferences [26-28]. Finally, we identify cir-
cumstances under which a decision maker tolerates a
wrong decision.
To implement our approach, we first compute the
threshold probability at which the decision maker is
indifferent between alternative actions, based on the
level of regret one might feel when he/she makes a
wrong decision. We then employ the regret based DCA
to identify the optimal strategy for a particular decision
maker. The optimal strategy is the one that brings the
least regret in the case that it is, in retrospect, wrong.
We also show how to employ a prediction model to
estimate the probability of disease for a patient and con-
trast it with the decision maker’s threshold probability.
Finally, we incorporate the concept of acceptable regret
in the decision process to identify the conditions under
which the decision maker tolerates a potentially wrong
decision.
Methods
Decision analysis based on regret theory
Figure 1 depicts a typical decision tree describing
administration of treatment guided by a prediction
model. There are two competing strategies (treat, and
do not treat), and four possible outcomes as described
by the combinations: treat/do not treat and necessary/
unnecessary.
In Figure 1, p = P(D +)is the probability associated with
the presence of the disease as estimated by a prediction
model;1 - p = P(D -)is the probability associated with the
absence of the disease, and, Ui, i Î [1,4], are the utilities
corresponding to each outcome. For example, U1 is the
utility of administering treatment to a patient who has
the disease (e.g. treat when necessary), and U2 is the uti-
lity of administering treatment to a patient who does not
have the disease (e.g. administering unnecessary treat-
ment). Note that we use the term “treatment” in the gen-
eric sense of health care intervention, which may indicate
therapy, procedure, or a diagnostic test.
The probabilistic nature of prognostication models
complicates significantly the decision process. For exam-
ple, if a prediction model estimates the probability of a
patient having a disease equal to 40%, it is unclear
whether this patient should receive treatment or not. A
solution from the point of view of the classical decision
theory is to employ the concept of threshold probability
Pt , which is defined as the probability at which the
decision maker is indifferent between two strategies (e.g.
administer treatment or not) [27,29,30]. Based on the
threshold concept, the patient should be treated if p ≥
Pt and should not be treated otherwise.
However, since in most cases decisions are made
under uncertainty and can never be 100% accurate
[23,26,28,31-34]. Thus, after a decision has been made
one may discover that another alternative would have
been preferable. This knowledge may bring a sense of
loss or regret to the decision maker [23,26,28,31-34].
Regret can be particularly strong when the conse-
quences of wrong decisions are life threatening or ser-
iously influence the quality of the patient’s life.
Formally, regret can be expressed as the difference
between the utility of the outcome of the action taken
and the utility of the outcome of the action that, in ret-
rospect, should have been taken [23,26,28,31-34]. Regret
Figure 1 Decision tree for administration of treatment.I nt h i s
figure, p = P(D +) is the probability associated with the presence of
a disease; 1 -p=P (D- ) is the probability associated with the
absence of the disease; Ui,iÎ [1,4], are the utilities corresponding
to each outcome. Note that we use the term “treatment” in the
generic sense of health care intervention, which may indicate
therapy, procedure, or a diagnostic test.
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Page 2 of 14can be felt by any party involved in the decision-making
process (e.g. patients receiving treatment, patient’s
proxies or physicians administering treatment). For the
rest of this paper we assume that the decision maker is
the treating physician.
W ef i r s te m p l o yr e g r e tt h e o r yt oe s t i m a t et h et h r e s h -
old probability, Pt , at which the physician is indifferent
between alternative management strategies (e.g. admin-
ister treatment or not). In order to accomplish this, we
describe regret in terms of the errors of (1) not treating
the patient who has the disease, and (2) treating the
patient who does not have the disease.
Figure 2 describes the derivation of regret associated
with each strategy based on the utilities of each action’s
outcome. As can be noted, the regret associated with
the error of not treating the patient when he/she should
have received treatment (the probability of disease is p ≥
Pt), Rg(Rx-, D+), is equal to the loss in benefits of treat-
ment. This can be expressed as the difference between
the utility of receiving treatment and having the disease,
and the utility of not receiving treatment and having the
disease (U1-U3).
Similarly, the regret associated with treating the
patient who should not have received treatment (the
probability of disease is p <Pt), Rg(Rx+, D-), is equal to
harms incurred due to treatment. This can be expressed
as the difference between the utilities of not having the
disease and not receiving treatment, and not having the
disease and receiving treatment (U4-U2). We expect no
regret in the cases of correct treat/no treat decisions, Rg
(Rx+, D+) = Rg(Rx-, D-) = 0. The difference (U1-U3)
represents the consequences of not administering treat-
ment where indicated, while (U4-U2) represents the
consequences of administering treatment to a patient
who does not need it. Under these assumptions, the
threshold probability, Pt is equal to [27,29,30]:
P UU
UU
t =
+
−
−
1
1 13
42
(1)
Equation 1 effectively captures the preferences of the
decision maker towards administering or not adminis-
tering treatment. At the individual level, equation 1
shows how the threshold probability relates to the way
the decision maker weighs false negative (i.e. failing to
provide necessary treatment) vs. false positive (i.e.
administering unnecessary treatment) results [24,25].
Note that the fraction
UU
UU
13
42
−
− is undefined for U4 -
U2 = 0, which means that in this situation there is no
regret associated with administering unnecessary treat-
ment. Under these circumstances, Pt = 100%, indicating
that treatment is justified only in case of absolute cer-
tainty of disease (p = 100%), a realistically unachievable
goal [26].
Elicitation of threshold probability
There are numerous techniques for eliciting the decision
maker’s preferences regarding treatment administration
[35]. None of them has been proven to be better than
the other. We argue that any attempt to measure peo-
ple’s preferences and risk attitudes should be derived
from an underlying theory of decision-making that can
be applied to a problem or a class of the problems at
hand. We approach elicitation of preferences by captur-
ing people attitudes (e.g. physicians’) through threshold
probabilities. Normatively, a threshold probability
reflects indifference between two alternative manage-
ment strategies.
There are few commonly used methods to assess the
value of this indifference for a decision maker such as
the standard gamble, and the time trade-off [35-37].
The problem is that both standard gamble and time
trade-off are time-consuming, cognitively more complex
and are shown that can lead to biased estimates of peo-
ple’s preferences [36,37]. An alternative method is to
use rating scales, such as visual analog scales (VAS),
which are considerably easier to administer and better
understood by the participants. The problem with ana-
log scales, however, is that they cannot capture health
state trade-offs [36,37].
T h ep r o p o s e dm e t h o dr e t a i n st h es i m p l i c i t yo fV A S
but it takes into account the consequences of possible
mistakes in decision-making by utilizing two visual ana-
log scales. The first scale aims to assess the regret asso-
ciated with potential error of failing to administer
beneficial treatment (“regret of omission”). The second
Figure 2 Regret model of the decision tree for administration
of treatment. In this figure, p: probability of having the disease; 1-
p: probability of not having the disease; Pt: threshold probability for
treatment; Rg: regret associated with wrong decisions; Rx-:n o
treatment; Rx+: treatment; D+: disease is present; D-: disease is
absent. For example, Rg(Rx+, D-): regret associated with the error of
treating the patient who did not have the disease.
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sary treatment (“regret of commission”). Using these
two scales we can capture trade-offs and compute the
threshold probability at which a decision maker is indif-
ferent between two alternative management strategies.
We employed the two visual analog scales with typical
100 points [35-37]anchored by no regret and maximal
regret. This is modeled after pain assessment limiting
the maximum possible pain that a person can experi-
ence [38]. Accordingly, we can elicit threshold probabil-
ities by asking the physician to weigh the regret
associated with wrong decisions (e.g. giving unnecessary
treatment vs. failure to administer necessary treatment)
using a numerical (0 to 100) scale. The questions may
be narrowly defined related to specific outcomes (e.g.,
survival/mortality, heart attack etc.). We should, how-
ever, note that most treatments are associated with mul-
tiple dimensions, some good and some bad. This is a
fundamental reason why no universally accepted method
for assessment of decision-makers’ preferences has been
developed so far. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to
accurately determine the trade-offs across multiple out-
comes that can be permuted in a number of ways. A
solution to this problem is to capture the decision-
maker’s global or “holistic” perception toward treatment.
By asking questions about trade-offs in this way, we
directly address both cognitive mechanisms-intuitive
and deliberative- of the decision process. This, in turn,
can lead to more accurate assessment of the decision
makers’ preferences.
For example, to elicit the physician’s threshold prob-
ability, we may ask the following questions:
1. On a scale 0 to 100, where 0 indicates no regret
and 100 indicates the maximum regret you could
feel, how would you rate the level of your regret if
you failed to provide necessary treatment to your
patient (i.e. did not give treatment that, in retrospect,
you should have given)? [Note that the answer to
this question corresponds to the (U1-U3) expression
in equation 1)].
2. On a scale 0 to 100, where 0 indicates no regret
and 100 indicates the maximum regret you could
feel, how would you rate the level of your regret if
you had administered unnecessary treatment to your
patient (i.e. administered treatment that, in retro-
spect, should have not been given)? [Note the answer
to this question corresponds to the (U4-U2) expres-
sion in equation 1).]
For example, suppose that the physician answers 60
and 30 to the questions 1 and 2, respectively. This
means that the physician considers 60/30 = 2 times
worse to fail to administer treatment that should
have been given than to continue unnecessary
treatment. Then, the threshold probability for this
physician is:
P UU
UU
t =
+
−
−
==
1
1 13
42
1
3
33%.
Thus, the physician would be unsure as to whether to
treat or not the patient if the patient’s probability of dis-
ease as computed by the prediction model was 33%.
Thus, the recommended action, which is based on elici-
tation of the decision-maker preferences, is directly
derived from the underlying theoretical model.
Regret based decision curve analysis (DCA)
Decision-makers may be presented with many alterna-
tive strategies that can be difficult to model. A simple,
yet powerful approach that is based on experience of a
typical practicing physician is to compare the strategy
based on modeling with those scenarios when all or no
patient is treated. That is, the clinical alternatives to the
prediction model strategy is to assume that all patients
have the disease and thus treat them all, or to assume
that no patient has the disease and thus treat none [25].
In this case the clinical dilemma a physician faces when
considering treatment is threefold: (1) treat all the
patients (“treat all”), (2)treat no patients (“treat none”),
and (3) use a prediction model and treat a patient if p ≥
Pt (“model”).
The optimal decision depends on the preferences of
the decision maker as captured by the threshold prob-
ability. We use Decision Curve Analysis (DCA) [24,25]
to identify the range of threshold probabilities at which
each strategy (“treat all”, “treat none”, and “model”)i so f
value. Traditional DCA uses the (net expected) benefits
associated with each strategy to recommend the best
strategy [24,25]. In this work, we consider that the opti-
mal strategy is the one that brings the least regret in
case it is proven wrong, retrospectively.
One view about decision curves is that they should
not be used in clinical practice: the researcher deter-
mines whether the decision curve justifies the use of
the model in practice and then makes a simple
recommendation yes or no as to whether clinicians
should base their decisions on the model [39].
Another approach, which we propose here, is that
threshold probabilities obtained in clinical practice
should be compared against the decision curve to
determine which strategy should be used (e.g. use a
model, biopsy all men, biopsy no-one). This might be
necessary if there is no strategy with the highest net
benefit across the entire range of reasonable threshold
probabilities.
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ing all of the alternative strategies. By solving the deci-
sion tree, we can estimate the expected regret associated
with each strategy [23,26,28,31-34]. For example,
ERg Model p FN U U p FP U U [] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) =− + − − 13 42 1 (2)
Here, FN (probability of false negatives) represents the
conditional probability P(p <Pt|D +)of not treating the
patient who has the disease.
FP (probability of false positives) is the conditional
probability P(p ≥ Pt|D -)of treating the patient who does
not have the disease.
Similarly,
TP =1-FN = P(p ≥ Pt|D +)(probability of true posi-
tives): Probability of treating the patient who has the
disease.
TN =1-FP = P(p <Pt|D -) (probability of true nega-
tives): Probability of not treating the patient who does
not have the disease.
After re-scaling the utilities by dividing each utility
with the expression U1 - U3,a n dr e p l a c i n g
UU
UU
P
P
t
t
42
131
−
−− = , we get the expression:
ERg Model p FN p FP
P
P
pT P p F P
P
P
P
t
t
t
t
[] ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
=+ −
−
=−+ −
−
=
1
1
11
1
( () () pP D P pP D
P
P
t
t
tt <∩ + + ≥∩ −
− 1
(3)
For the strategies of administering treatment and not
administering treatment, the expected regret is derived as:
ERg Treat all p U U p
P
P
t
t
[ ] () ( ) ()   =− − =−
−
11
1
42 (4)
ERg Treat none p U U p [] ( )   =− = 13 (5)
Subtracting each of these expected regrets from the
expected regret of the “Treat none” (baseline) strategy
we obtain the “Net Expected Regret Difference
(NERD)“:
NERD Treat none Model ERg Treat none ERg Model
pp
      [, ] [] [ ]
(
=− =
=−1− −− −
−
=− −
−
TP p FP
P
P
pT P p F P
P
P
t
t
t
t
)( ) ()
() ( ) ()
1
1
1
1
(6)
NERD Treat none Treat al ERg Treat none ERg Treat all            [, ] [] [ =− ] ]
() =− −
−
pp
P
P
t
t
1
1
(7)
NERD Treat none Treat none [,] = 0 (8)
Note that these are exactly t h es a m ef o r m u l a sa s
those derived by Vickers and Elkin [25] who employ the
expected-utility model in “decision curve analysis”
(DCA). The regret based derivation, however, is mathe-
matically more parsimonious. The original DCA formu-
lation required several mathematical manipulations
making the simplicity of regret approach more attrac-
tive. In addition, as argued throughout the manuscript,
the regret formulation may have additional decision-the-
oretical advantages as it enables experiencing conse-
quences of decisions both at the emotional (system 1)
and cognitive (system 2) level [23,40].
In addition to equations 6-8, we are interested in the
NERD between the strategies “Treat all” and “Model”:
NERD Treat all Model ERg Treat all ERg Model
pT N
[, ] [] [ ]
() ( )
     =−
=− 1
P P
P
pF N t
t 1−
− () (9)
The NERD equations associated with each strategy, 6-
8, can be further reformulated as follows
[23,25,26,28,31-34,41]:
N E R D Pp P D Pp P D
P
P
TP
n
FP
n
P
P
t
t
t
t
tt = ≥ ∩+ − ≥ ∩−
−
=−⋅
−
() ()
##
1
1
(10)
Similarly, equation 9 can be re-written as:
NERD p TN
P
P
pF N
Pp P D
P
P
Pp P D
TN
t
t
t
t
tt
=−
−
−
=< ∩ −
−
−< ∩ +
=
() ( ) ( )
() ()
#
1
1
1
n n
P
P
FN
n
t
t
⋅
−
−
1
#
(11)
Equations 10 and 11 above are useful when calculating
NERD as a function of Pt. The probabilities P(p ≥ Pt ∩ D +),
P(p ≥ Pt ∩ D -), P(p ≥ Pt ∩ D +), and P(p ≥ Pt ∩ D -) are
estimated as follows:
￿ P(p ≥ Pt ∩ D +) ≈ the number of patients who
have the disease and for whom the prognostic prob-
ability is greater than or equal to Pt(with #TP =
number of patients with true positive results,
Pp P D t
TP
n ≥∩+ () ≈ # ,w h e r en is the total num-
ber of patients in the study).
￿ P(p ≥ Pt ∩ D -) ≈ the number of patients who do
n o th a v et h ed i s e a s ea n df o rw h o mt h ep r o g n o s t i c
probability of disease is greater than or equal to Pt
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results, Pp P D t
FP
n ≥∩ () ≈ –) # .
￿ P(p <Pt ∩ D +) ≈ the number of patients who have
the disease and for whom the prognostic probability
of disease is less than Pt (with #TN = number
of patients with true negative results,
Pp P D t
TN
n < ∩+ () ≈ # ).
￿ P(p <Pt ∩ D -) ≈ the number of patients who do
n o th a v et h ed i s e a s ea n df o rw h o mt h ep r o g n o s t i c
probability of disease is less than Pt (with #FN=num-
ber of patients with false negative results,
Pp P D t
FN
n < ∩ () ≈ –) # .
When computing NERD[Treat none, treat all]w e
assume that all patients have the disease, thus #TP is
the number of people who actually have the disease and
#FP is the number of people who do not have the dis-
ease but are given treatment. On the other hand, when
computing NERD[Treat none, Model]from equation 10
and, NERD[Treat all, Model]from equation 11, #TP,
#FP, #TN, and #FN are computed for each threshold
probability assuming that a patient has the disease if the
prognostic probability is greater than or equal to the
threshold probability and does not have the disease,
otherwise.
NERDs of each of the strategies described are plotted
against different values of threshold probability. The
NERD values provide information relative to decrease
in regret when two strategies are compared against
each other for a given threshold probability. If NERD =
0, this means that there is no difference in the regret
between two strategies:
NERD strategy strategy
ERg strategy ERg strategy
[, ]
() (
     12 0
1
=⇔
− 2 20
12
)
() ()
=⇔
= ERg strategy ERg strategy
(12)
If NERD > 0, this means that the second strategy will
inflict less regret than the first strategy, and hence it is
preferable:
NERD strategy strategy
ERg strategy ERg strategy
[, ]
() (
     12 0
1
>⇔
> 2 2)
(13)
Similarly, if NERD < 0, the first strategy represents the
optimal decision among the two strategies:
Figure 3 Generalized decision tree for administration of treatment. In this figure, p: probability of having the disease; 1-p: probability of not
having the disease; Rg: regret associated with wrong decisions; Rx-: no treatment; Rx+: treatment; D+: disease is present; D-: disease is absent.
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ERg strategy ERg strategy
[, ]
() (
     12 0
1
<⇔
< 2 2)
(14)
The algorithm for the Regret DCA is implemented as
follows:
1. Select a value for threshold probability.
2. Assuming that patients should be treated if p ≥ Pt
a n ds h o u l dn o tb et r e a t e do t h e r w i s e ,c o m p u t e# T P
and #FP for the prediction model.
3. Calculate the NERD(Treat none, Model)using
equation 10.
4. Calculate NERD(Treat all, Model)using equation
11.
5. Compute the NERD(Treat none, Treat all)using
equation 10 where #TP is the number of patients
having the disease and #FP is the number of patients
without disease who got treatment.
6. Repeat steps 1 - 6 for a range of threshold
probabilities.
7. Graph each NERD calculated in steps 3-5 against
each threshold probability.
Based on the Regret DCA methodology, the optimal
decision at each threshold probability is derived by com-
paring each pair of strategies through their correspond-
ing NERDs according to the transitivity principle (i.e., if
A > B, B > C then A > C). Thus, if NERD(strategy1,
strategy2) >NERD(strategy2, strategy3) > 0 then strategy
2 is better than strategy 1, and strategy 3 is better than
strategy 2. Therefore, strategy 3 is the optimal strategy.
Acceptable Regret
No decision model can guarantee that the recom-
mended strategy will be the correct one. Therefore, we
can always make a mistake and recommend treatment
we should not have, or fail to recommend treatment we
should have administered [42]. However, there are situa-
tions where the regret resulting from a wrong decision
will be tolerable. These situations are best described
under the notion of acceptable regret [26,28,31].
Formally, acceptable regret,Rg0, is defined as the portion
of utility a decision maker is willing to lose/sacrifice
when he/she adheres to a decision that may prove
wrong [26,28,31,32]. For example, a physician may
regret administering unnecessary treatment to a patient
but he/she can “still live with” the consequences of this
decision if she/he judged them to be trivial or
inconsequential.
We assume that there is a linear relationship between
the value of acceptable regret and the benefits of receiv-
ing treatment as well as the harms of receiving unneces-
sary treatment. This is a reasonable assumption because
acceptable regret is expected to operate within a narrow
range, at the lower or the upper end, of the probability
scale. We define acceptable regret in terms of benefits
of treatment, Rgb, as [43] the percentage (rb)o fb e n e f i t s
(U1 - U3)the decision maker is willing to forgo if his/her
decision NOT to treat was wrong:
Rg Rg r B r U U bb b 01 3 == = − () (15)
Alternatively, we define acceptable regret in terms of
harms of unnecessary treatment, Rgh, as [43] the percen-
tage (rh) of harms (U4 -U 2) the decision maker is will-
ing to incur if his/her decision of treating was wrong:
Rg Rg r H r U U hh h 04 2 === − () (16)
We use the concept of acceptable regret to further
refine the conditions under which the decision maker is
indifferent between two strategies. Recall that these con-
ditions have been initially captured in terms of threshold
probability, which does not incorporate the sense of tol-
erable losses. Thus, we proceed with the following defi-
nition: Two strategies are considered equivalent in
regret (e.g. will bring the same regret to the decision
maker if they are proven wrong, in retrospect), if the
absolute value of their net expected regret difference
(NERD) is less than or equal to a predetermined amount
of acceptable regret Rg0. In other words, there is no dif-
ference between choosing the strategy “treat all” or
“treat none” in terms of regret if:
|( , ) | NERD Treat none Treat all Rg ≤ 0 (17)
Similarly, the strategies “model” and “treat none” are
equivalent in regret if:
NERD Treat none Model Rg (, ) | ≤ 0 (18)
and the strategies “model” and “treat all”:
|( , ) | NERD Treat all Model Rg ≤ 0 (19)
The acceptable regret, Rg0, can be computed using any
of the two definitions described in equations 15 and 16.
We can also use equations 15 and 16 to identify the
prognostic probabilities at which the decision maker
would not regret the decision to which he/she is com-
mitted even if that decision may prove wrong. For
instance, we are typically interested in the prognostic
probability above which a physician would commit to
the decision to treat a patient, and the probability below
which he/she would not to treat a patient without feel-
ing undue consequences of these decisions [28]. In
other words, we are looking for the probabilities for
which ERg(Treat all) ≤ Rgh,a n dERg(Treat none) ≤ Rgb.
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and after scaling Rg0 by (U1 - U3), we obtain
Pr treat all h =− 1 (20)
Where Ptreat all is the prognostic probability above
which the physician would tolerate giving treatment that
may prove unnecessary. Similarly,
Pr treat none b = (21)
represents the prognostic probability below which the
physician would comfortably withhold treatment that
may prove beneficial, in retrospect.
Note that equations 20 and 21 express acceptable regret
in terms of probabilities while equations 17-19 define it in
terms of NERD. Hence, the outputs of these equations are
not the same; rather, they complement each other.
Elicitation of acceptable regret
In most cases the decision maker does not have a com-
plete understanding of benefits lost or harms inflicted
and cannot assign a precise number to them. For this
reason, we do not suggest inquiring directly about the
value of r.I n s t e a d ,w ep r o p o s ee l i c i t i n gr through the
decision-maker’s responses to specific clinical scenarios.
For example, we propose the following approach:
Assume that you have 100 patients with the same
probability of disease as the patient you are currently
treating. You need to decide whether each of these
patients should receive treatment or not. Since no predic-
tion model is 100% accurate, it is expected that you will
make some mistakes in your treatment recommendations
(e.g. you may recommend treatment to a patient who
does not need it, or fail to recommend treatment to a
patient who needs it).
1. We are now interested in knowing your tolerance
toward administering unnecessary treatment i.e. we
want to learn what the magnitude of the unavoid-
able error you can live with is by inflicting poten-
tially harmful treatment on a patient. Note that if
you say that your acceptable regret is zero, this
means that you can only make decision if you abso-
lutely certain that your recommendation is correct.
Out of the number (100-y) of patients who should
have not received treatment, how many patients
would you tolerate treating? (The answer is used to
compute rh).
2. We are interested in knowing your tolerance
toward failing to provide necessary treatment i.e. we
want to learn what the magnitude of unavoidable
error you can live with is by forgoing potentially
beneficial treatment. Note that if you say that your
acceptable regret is zero, this means that you can
only make decision if you absolutely certain that
your recommendation is correct.
Out of the number (100-x) of patients who should
have been treated, how many patients would
you tolerate not treating? (The answer is used to
compute rb).
It is unnecessary to ask the decision maker to answer
both questions. We suggest asking only the question
related to the recommendation the physician is about to
make e.g. if the recommendation is about administering
treatment, then the decision maker should be asked the
second question, while if it is about not giving treat-
ment, then he/she can ask the first question.
The value of acceptable regret is plotted in the regret
DCA graph to visually facilitate the decision making
process. At a specific threshold probability all strategies
for which |NERD| ≤ Rg0 are considered equivalent in
regret, according to the definition in the previous
section.
Example
We will employ a prostate cancer biopsy example to
demonstrate the applicability of our approach. Prostate
cancer biopsy is an invasive and uncomfortable proce-
dure, which can be painful and is associated with a risk
of infection. However, it is often necessary for diagnosis
of prostate cancer, one of the leading causes of cancer
death in men.
Men are typically biopsied for prostate cancer if they
have an elevated level of prostate-specific antigen (PSA).
However, most men with a high PSA do not have pros-
tate cancer. This has led to the idea that statistical mod-
els based on multiple predictors (PSA, age, family
history, other markers) might be used to predict biopsy
outcomes and hence aid biopsy decisions for individual
patients. A physician seeing a patient with an elevated
P S Ah a st h r e ep o s s i b l eo p t i o n s :g of o rb i o p s y ,r e f u s e
biopsy or look up his probability in a statistical model
and then make a decision.
We utilize an unpublished statistical model that com-
putes probability of cancer based on the dataset
described in [44] to compare each of these options.
Following the algorithm described in the regret DCA
section, we generate the decision curves depicted in
Figure 4. This figure is used to determine the optimal
strategy for different values of threshold probability. The
optimization procedure is implemented in three steps
where the strategies in each NERD are compared to
each other as in equations 12- 14 at a specific threshold
probability. For example, at threshold probability 15%:
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Page 8 of 141. NERD(biopsy none,model) > 0 therefore, the
model is preferred to the strategy biopsy none.
2. NERD(biopsy none, biopsy all) > 0 therefore, the
strategy biopsy all is preferred to the strategy biopsy
none.
3. NERD(biopsy all,model) > 0 therefore, the model
is preferred to the strategy biopsy none
Consequently, “model” corresponds to the optimal
strategy.
Repeating the same procedure for all threshold prob-
abilities, we can see that deciding based on the statistical
model is the optimal strategy (i.e. results in the mini-
mum expected regret) for threshold probabilities
between 8% and 43%. For threshold probabilities
between 42% and 95%, the optimal strategy is to biopsy
no patients, while for 0% to 8% both model and biopsy
all strategies are optimal.
To interpret these results, we have to consider how a
typical physician values the harms of a false negative
(missing a cancer) and a false positive (an unnecessary
biopsy) result. If regret associated with unnecessary
biopsy is felt to be worse than missing cancer, then
according to equation 1, the threshold probability is
greater than 50%. However, it is unlikely that a physi-
cian would consider an unnecessary biopsy to be worse
than missing a cancer, so the threshold probability for
biopsy must be less than 50%. Thus, a reasonable range
of threshold probabilities might indeed be between 8% -
43% as suggested by our model. As the model is super-
ior across this entire range, we can conclude that, irre-
spective of the physician’s exact preferences,m a k i n ga
biopsy decision based on the statistical model will lead
to lower expected regret than an alternative such as
biopsying all or no men. Based on discussions with clin-
icians, we believe that a reasonable range of threshold
probability is 10% - 40%. As the regret associated with
the model strategy is lowest across this entire range, we
can recommend use of the model. Nonetheless, we do
not have a complete sample of all physician preferences
and it is possible that a physician may have a probability
outside of this range.
To illustrate the applicability of the acceptable regret
model, assume that the value of acceptable regret for
forgoing the benefits of biopsy (equation 15) is equal to
± 0.01. Consider the case that the decision maker’s
threshold probability is equal to 20%. According to Fig-
ure 4, the optimal strategy should be suggested by the
statistical model. However, we see that
NERD treat none model    1 ,. () < 00
which means that the strategies “biopsy none” (biopsy
no patients) and “model” are equivalent in regret.
Therefore, the prediction model does not offer any bet-
ter information and thus, it can be disregarded.
Case Study
This section describes the overall decision process
regarding prostate cancer biopsy. The process begins
with elicitation of the threshold probability from the
treating physician and continues with evaluation of the
available strategies based on regret DCA (Figure 4).
Then, if necessary, the probability of cancer based on
the available prognostic model is computed and con-
trasted with the threshold probability. Finally, the con-
cept of acceptable regret is employed to arrive at the
strategy which is the most tolerable to the decision
maker who always faces possibilities of making wrong
decisions. For the remainder of this section the normal
font text corresponds to the author comments. The text
in bold and underlined font corresponds to questions
to, and answers from the physician respectively. The ita-
lic text is notes to the reader. We demonstrate the
applicability of our approach using hypothetical answers
from two physicians.
The overall decision process is described as follows:
1. Interview with the physician to elicit his/her thresh-
old probability.
a. On the scale 0 to 100, where 0 indicates no
regret and 100 indicates the maximum regret you
could feel, how would you rate your level of
regret if you failed to provide necessary
treatment?
Physician #1 answer: 50, Physician #2 answer: 70.
These values correspond to U1 - U3 from equation1.
b. O nt h es c a l e0t o1 0 0 ,w h e r e0i n d i c a t e sn o
regret and 100 indicates the maximum regret you
could feel, how would you rate your level of
regret if you administered unnecessary
treatment?
Physician #1: 10, Physician #2: 60. This value
corresponds to U4 - U2 from equation 1.
The threshold probability is equal to (equation 1): Phy-
sician #1: 16%, Physician #2: 46%.
2. Using the graph in Figure 4, identify the optimal
strategy for the computed threshold probability.
Physician #1: For threshold probability equal to 16%,
the optimal decision is derived by solving the inequalities
(Figure 4, equations 12-14):
1. NERD(biopy all, model) > 0, the strategy “model”
is better than the strategy “biopsy all”
2. NERD(biopsy none, model) > 0, the strategy
“model” is better than the strategy “biopsy none”
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Page 9 of 143. NERD(biopsy none, biopsy all) > 0, the strategy
“biopsy all” is better than “biopsy none”.
Therefore, the optimal strategy is the “model” which
corresponds to biopsy based on the probability of
cancer predicted by the statistical model. The next
step is to compute the patient’s probability of cancer
and contrast it with the threshold probability.
Physician #2: For threshold probability equal to 46%,
the optimal decision would be the “biopsy none”
strategy. In this case, even though computing the
probability of cancer will not affect the physician’s
decision, it will help identify the circumstances under
which the physician would tolerate unnecessary
biopsy of the patient.
3. Compute the cancer probability for the specific
patient based on the statistical model.
a. If the cancer probability is greater than or equal to
the threshold probability, then the surgeon should
biopsy the patient.
b. If the cancer probability is less than the threshold
probability, then the surgeon should not biopsy the
patient.
Let us assume that the probability of cancer for the
specific patient is equal to 20%. The threshold
probability for Physician #1 is 16% (as computed in
step 1). In this case, Physician #1 considers recom-
mending biopsy. As noted in step 2b, the best strategy
for Physician #2 is recommending not to biopsy any
patients regardless their probability of cancer.
4. Elicitation of the level of acceptable regret.
Assume that you have 100 patients, all with prob-
ability of cancer equal to 20% (the same as your
patient). This means that out of 100 patients, 20
patients will have cancer while 80 will not have can-
cer. You need to decide whether each of these
patients should undergo biopsy or not. Since no pre-
diction model is 100% accurate, it is expected that
you will make some mistakes in your recommenda-
tions (e.g. you may recommend biopsy to a patient
who does not need it, or fail to recommend biopsy to
a patient who may need it).
a. The physician considers biopsy (Physician #1):
Out of the 20 patients who should be biopsied,
for how many patients would you tolerate not
recommending a necessary biopsy? 1.
This answer corresponds to rb == 1
20 00 5 . and
acceptable regret Rgb = rb(U1 - U3)=0.05 * 0.5 =
Figure 4 Regret DCA regarding biopsy to detect prostate cancer. Thin line: biopsy all patients; solid line: biopsy no patients; dashed line:
prediction model. The optimal strategy is derived by the comparison of each pair of strategies from all NERDs as per equations 12-14. The
statistical model is the optimal strategy for threshold probabilities between 8% and 42%. For threshold probabilities between 43% and 95%, the
optimal strategy is to biopsy no patients, while for 0% to 8% both “model” and “biopsy all” strategies are optimal. The lines of acceptable regret
denote the regret area in which different strategies are equivalent.For example, at threshold probability equal to 20%, the optimal strategy is
acting based on the prognostic model. However, NERD(biopsy none, model) is below the acceptable regret line which indicates that the
strategies “biopsy none” and “model” are equivalent in regret. Therefore the optimal strategy is to biopsy no patients as the use of model is
deemed to be superfluous. Similarly,at threshold probability equal to 15%, the optimal strategy is to act based on the model and the strategies
“biopsy all” and “biopsy none” are equivalent in regret. Finally, at threshold probability equal to 9%, the optimal strategies are both “model” and
“biopsy all”. However, since NERD(biopsy all, model) is below the acceptable regret, the strategies “biopsy all” and “model” are equivalent in
regret. Therefore the optimal strategy is to biopsy all patients.
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Page 10 of 140.025. The optimal strategy at Pt =1 6 %is to use the
statistical model (Figure 4). For Pt =1 6 %and Rgb =
0.025 all NERDs are greater than acceptable regret,
thus the optimal strategy remains the statistical
model.
b. The physician does not consider biopsy (Physician
#2).
Out of the 80 patients who should not undergo
biopsy, for how many patients would you tolerate
recommending an unnecessary biopsy? 40.
The answer provided by the Physician #2 corresponds
to rh == 40
80 05 0 . and acceptable regret Rgh = rh(U4
- U2) = 0.5 * 0.6 = 0.3.
The optimal strategy for Pt =4 6 %is to biopsy no
patients (Figure 4). Also, for pt =4 6 %and Rgh =0 . 3 ,
we have: |NERD(biopsy none, biopsy all)| = | -0.639
>Rgh,| NERD(biopsy none, model)| = | - 0.003| <Rgh
and |NERD(biopsy all, model) = 0.6364 >Rgh. This
means that the strategies “biopsy none” and “model”
are equivalent in regret. In practical terms no addi-
tional effort is justified for using the statistical model.
5. Based on equations 20 and 21, we can determine
the prognostic probabilities above and under which the
physician would tolerate performing an unnecessary
biopsy, or not to do so when he should have done it.
a. Physician #1 considers recommending biopsy to
his/her patient. Based on equation 21, the physician
would tolerate not recommending a biopsy for any
prognostic probability below Ptreat none = rb = 5%.
b. Physician #2 considers not recommending biopsy to
his/her patient. Based on equation 20, the decision
maker would tolerate recommending an unnecessary
biopsy for any prognostic probability above Ptreat all =
1-rh = 50%
Discussion
Currently, there is no agreed upon method for how pre-
ferences regarding multiple objectives that typically go
in opposite directions (i.e. most medical interventions
are associated both with benefits and harms) should be
elicited. We have presented and demonstrated an
approach to decision making based on regret theory and
decision curve analysis. The approach presented in this
paper relies on the concept of the threshold probability
at which a decision maker is indifferent between strate-
gies, to suggest the optimal decision [27,29,30]. Unlike
the approaches described in the classic threshold papers
[27,29,30], our approach is based on the notion that the
value of threshold probability is clearly subjective and
depends on the personal preferences of the decision
maker. We elicit threshold probabilities based on the
regret one may feel in case that the chosen strategy is
proven wrong, in retrospect. Although one can narrow
down the approach to specific medical outcomes, we
believe that eliciting preferences in a global, holistic way
is more useful if our approach is to be used in the
actual practice.
We believe that the model described here has a direct
practical application in overcoming many difficulties
related to linking evidence with patient’s preferences to
arrive at the optimal decision- the issues that plagued
the field of decision-making. The problem of eliciting
preferences and integrating them in a coherent decision
is not a simple one. We argue that the approach we are
advocating here represents a contribution to the field of
decision making, be should not be seen as the panacea
to medical decision making. However, we anticipate our
methodology to be suitable for medical decision primar-
ily associated with trade-offs between quality and quan-
tity of life.
Over that last couple of decades, many attempts have
been made to develop the best method to take these
considerations in real-life settings. Unfortunately, as
explained, no approach has succeeded [35]. We believe
that the reason for this is that most approaches to elicit
decision maker’s preferences as well as to help improve
decision-making have relied on a rational framework
based on expected utility theory [21]. However, modern
cognitive theories (within so called dual-processing the-
ory) have convincingly demonstrated that human deci-
sions rely both on intuition (system 1) and analytical,
deliberative process (system 2) in balancing risks and
benefits in the decision-making process [22,40,45]. We
believe that rational decision-making should take into
account both formal principles of rationality and human
intuition about good decisions [46,47]. The key is to
preserve rational framework, while allowing anticipation
of the effect of decision on emotions (while avoiding
biases associated with intuitive thinking) [40]. One way
to accomplish this is to use the cognitive emotion of
regret to serve as a link between system 1 (i.e. intuitive
system) and system 2 (i.e. deliberative, analytical cogni-
tive system). By anticipating consequences of our actions
and circumstances under which we can live with our
mistakes, we bring together both aspects of cognition
that may lead to better and more satisfactory decision-
making.
Specifically, we argue that eliciting people’s prefer-
ences using regret theory may be superior to using tra-
ditional utility theory because regret forces decision-
makers to explicitly consider consequences of decisions.
We have previously shown that we can always make
errors in decision-making: recommend treatment that
does not work, or fail to recommend treatment that
does [26]. Therefore, we reformulated DCA from the
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Page 11 of 14regret theory’s point of view. Furthermore, it has been
shown that the expected utility theory is often violated
to minimize anticipated regret [33,34].In addition, there
is substantial evidence that medical decision making
aims to minimize regret associated with wrong decisions
[48-50].
Moreover, while descriptive, normative, and prescrip-
tive theories [17] tend to evaluate individual outcomes,
the approach presented here evaluates all of the out-
comes in a holistic manner. Our approach is consistent
with Reyna’s “gist” or “fuzzy trace theory” in which the
decision-maker characterizes gist of each outcome to
arrive at a given decision [51]. For example, consider
that a decision maker is provided with a list of harms
and benefits associated with each decision, as it is cur-
rently recommended by the practice guidelines panels
[52]. In traditional theories, the decision maker evaluates
a treatment strategy by reasoning on each of the harms
and benefits associated with a given strategy. This, as
discussed above, would mean integration of all multiple
outcomes that often go in different directions typically
within limited time-frame. Due to the complexity of
these decisions, however, this approach overwhelms the
decision maker as our brain capacity is limited. The
regret DCA methodology quantifies the global attitudes
of the decision maker towards a specific strategy with-
out requiring separate reasoning for each of the harms
and benefits. This holistic assessment occurs within the
dual processing cognitive system, which evaluates collec-
tively the harms and the benefits associated with each
treatment alternative. By assessing trade-offs through
both cognitive mechanisms-intuitive and deliberative-
we believe that we can assess decision makers’ prefer-
ences more accurately.
In general, since our method relies on the elicitation
of threshold probability we recommend using our meth-
odology for every patient. As every patient’sv a l u e sa r e
d i f f e r e n tt h et h r e s h o l dp r obability should indeed be
patient-specific. For example, a physician may act
“aggressively” for a young patient who is the father of
two underage kids and less aggressively for an older
patient. However, in the cancer biopsy example, it is
expected that most of the patients should present with
similar characteristics and therefore most physicians
would settle in a small area of threshold probabilities. In
this case repeating the elicitation process for every
patient would be impractical. Nevertheless, this is an
empirical question worthy of further investigation as
alluded above.
Our approach may help reconcile formal principles of
rationality and human intuitions about good decisions
that may better reflect “rationality” in medical decision-
making [21,32,46,47]. We hope that our theoretical
work will stimulate empirical testing of the concepts
outlined in this paper. Toward this end, we are currently
working on developing a prescriptive computerized deci-
sion-support system to facilitate the application of the
model described herein. Such a system is expected to be
user friendly with built-in automatic manipulation of
the complex calculations that may be off-putting to
many users. We hope to report on testing of our system
in the near future.
Conclusions
We have presented a decision making methodology that
relies on regret theory and decision curve analysis to
assist physicians in choosing between appropriate health
care interventions. Our methodology utilizes the cogni-
tive emotion of regret to determine the decision maker’s
preferences towards available strategies and DCA to
suggest the optimal decision for the specific decision
maker. We believe that our approach is suitable for
those clinical situations when the best management
option is the one associated with the least amount of
regret (e.g. diagnosis and treatment of advanced cancer,
etc).
As with any other novel theoretical work, our
approach has its limitations. First, it has not been
empirically tested in a clinical setting. However, we are
in the process of developing the appropriate decision
support tools to bring our model into clinical practice
and evaluate its usefulness with actual physicians and
patients. Second, the methodology presented is appro-
priate for single point decision making. Further investi-
gation is required to determine the application of regret
theory to decisions that re-occur over time. Finally, we
assume that there is only one decision maker involved
in the decision process. Nevertheless, our plan for future
work includes extending our methodology to shared
decision-making that will include both physician and
patient in the decision process and investigate whether
in practice there is a difference between preferences and
choices made by physicians and their patients.
We summarize the contribution presented in this
paper as follows:
1. We propose a novel method for eliciting decision
makers’ preferences towards treatment administra-
tion. Contrary to traditional methodologies on elicit-
ing preferences, our method considers the
consequences of potential mistakes in decisions. We
propose a dual visual analog scale to capture errors
of omission and errors of commission and, therefore,
evaluate the trade-offs associated with each of the
available strategies.
2. We have reformulated DCA from the regret the-
ory point of view. Our approach is intuitively more
appealing to a decision maker and should facilitate
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tions when the best management option is the one
associated with the least amount of regret.
3. Finally, we utilize the concept of acceptable regret
to identify the circumstances under which a decision
maker tolerates a wrong decision.
We envision facilitation of the decision process in
clinical settings through a computerized decision sup-
port system available at the point of care. In fact, we are
in the process of developing such a system and hope to
report about it soon.
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